The impact of reasons for credit rating announcements in equity and CDS markets by Imbierowicz, Björn & Wahrenburg, Mark
 
 
 
The Impact of Reasons for Credit Rating Announcements 
in Equity and CDS Markets 
 
 
 
Version: March 26, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Björn Imbierowicz*
  Mark Wahrenburg*
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Over the last four decades the literature on bond rating changes and its effects on security prices 
increased significantly with almost all studies not controlling for the respective reason for those. We 
therefore investigate the impact of rating events on the stock and the credit default swap (CDS) market 
incorporating rating reviews and rating changes together with the reason mentioned by the rating 
agency. Our results for the general effects  are in line with prior findings but conditioning on the 
respective reason shows that the markets’ anticipation of rating actions is largely driven by events due 
to  changes  in  firms’  operating  performance.  Furthermore,  we  provide  empirical  evidence  for  the 
hypothesis in prior literature that a surprise downgrade does not necessarily have to be bad news for 
stockholders when wealth is transferred from bondholders, but negative rating actions are always bad 
news  for  bondholders.  The  results  additionally  reveal  increasing  rating  announcement  effects  by 
declining credit quality of firms for both rating reviews and changes. 
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Although the literature on capital market reactions to credit rating announcements has grown 
significantly  over  the  last  four  decades  the  reasons  for  these  announcements  are  only 
considered in Goh and Ederington (1993). This appears astonishing especially in light of their 
result  that  not  all  announcements  implicate  a  sizeable  and  significant  effect  and  the 
corresponding  argumentation  that  “the  finding  of  previous  studies  that  the  market  reacts 
negatively to downgrade announcements is solely due to the announcements in (group 1)”   
(p.  2007).  According  to  this  notion,  studies  investigating  unconditional  capital  market 
reactions would incorporate a measurement error in terms of providing average results which 
are only driven by a specific type of rating announcement with the remainder being irrelevant. 
Therefore, they could not be interpreted in such general way as it is often performed. We try 
to merge the current literature on capital market reactions to credit rating announcements with 
their idea by conditioning on the respective reason for the rating announcement. 
The general impact of rating actions on capital markets has been discussed in prior research in 
several  aspects. The first  influential  study on this  topic was  written by Katz (1974) who 
investigated the effect of rating changes on bond yields. Subsequent studies amended this 
strand of literature employing also rating outlooks and rating reviews not only with regard to 
bond yields but also stock returns and CDS spread changes. Important research in this area 
includes Grier and Katz (1976), Hettenhouse and Sartoris (1976), Weinstein (1977), Pinches 
and Singleton (1978), Griffin et al. (1982), Ingram et al. (1983), Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1986), Hand et al. (1992), Wansley et al. (1992),  Matolcsy and Lianto (1995), Goh and 
Ederington  (1999),  Dichev  and  Piotroski  (2001),  Steiner  and  Heinke  (2001),  Hull  et  al. 
(2004), Norden and Weber (2004), Daniels and Jensen (2005), Micu et al. (2006), Di Cesare 
(2006), Jorion  and Zhang (2007b),  and Purda  (2007).  In general,  the findings  suggest  an 
anticipation as well as an announcement effect for negative rating events. The picture is not so 
clear for positive rating actions. While some studies find abnormal effects for those, others 2 
 
reason that their insignificant results may be due to their small number of positive events. 
Jorion and Zhang (2007b) provide empirical evidence that it may also be attributable to the 
empirical design of the cross-section. On the other hand, Ederington and Goh (1998) presume 
that firms prefer to release good news to the market but are hesitating with regard to bad 
news. Overall, there seems to be no definite answer if rating agencies are able to add valuable 
information  to  the  market  announcing  positive  rating  events  while  they  seem  to  be  in  a 
superior position disclosing negative information. 
Employing  705  rating  reviews  and  796  rating  changes  by  Moody’s,  we  investigate  the 
abnormal returns of stocks and the abnormal spread changes of CDS over the period 2001 
until  2007  incorporating  more  than  545,000  daily  observations.  The  respective  reason  is 
identified via keywords mentioned in the rating report and assigned to each rating event. Our 
choice to incorporate CDS in the analysis instead of bonds or loans derives from their ability 
to provide a better measure for obligors’ credit quality. Norden and Weber (2007), Blanco, 
Brennan and Marsh (2005), Zhu (2006) and Norden and Wagner (2008) have furthermore 
shown that CDS lead the bond as well as the loan market and accordingly are better suited for 
an analysis of market efficiency. Although CDS have been initiated not until the mid-90’s 
they quickly became the relevant market for credit risk with no abnormal contraction during 
the financial crisis.
1  
Our results  with regard  to  the  capital  market effects  of  unconditional  rating events are 
consistent with prior research implying an anticipation and announcement effect for negative 
rating actions but an either insignificant or only marginal outcome for positive events. In line 
with Kliger and Sarig (2000), and Jorion and Zhang (2007b)  the announcement effect for 
negative rating  events increases by declining credit quality of obligors not  only for rating 
                                                 
1 The annual meetings of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association’s (ISDA) on April 16, 2008 
mention a 37 percent growth for CDS from mid-2007 until year end strongly supporting continued growth in 
single-name credit derivatives despite the financial crisis which had strong negative effects on the liquidity and 
market volume of many structured credit derivates. 3 
 
changes but also for rating reviews. Conditioning on the respective reason reveals that the 
anticipation effect of a negative rating review and a negative rating change is attributable to 
events  due  to  firms’  operating  performance  with  all  other  reasons  being  of  rather  minor 
importance. This argues for investors’ awareness to changes in firms’ operating performance 
which also constitute the focus of many analysts. Furthermore, a large number of public firms 
are enforced by regulation to immediately disclose such information. Therefore, at least some 
investors already adjust their positions before the rating agency is able to completely evaluate 
firms’ future credit risk. On the other hand, given that for negative rating reviews most other 
reason categories show a significant announcement but no anticipation effect it also implies 
that especially for those rating agencies are able to add valuable information to the market.  
While the results empirically verify that negative rating change announcements are always 
bad  news  for  bondholders  the  stock  market  reveals  contradictory  effects.  Negative  rating 
review announcements result in positive abnormal returns when they are released for reasons 
of changes in firms’ capital structure implying that wealth is transferred from bondholders to 
stockholders. Note that all other reason categories show a negative effect. Accordingly, rating 
reviews due to capital structure changes bias the overall negative outcome upwards disclosing 
that interpretations in prior literature on the general effects have to be treated with caution. 
Goh and Ederington (1993), and Jorion and Zhang (2007a) already conjecture that a surprise 
bond rating downgrade does not necessarily have to be bad news for stockholders. While the 
latter base their assumption on theory the former are not able to show statistically significant 
results for their hypothesis. On the other hand due to reasons of data availability, they only 
incorporate rating changes but not rating reviews. However, those reviews should constitute a 
superior proxy for true rating event surprises because they often antecede the former. In line 
with their findings also our results for rating downgrades due to changes in firms’ capital 
structure are statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, a graphical analysis reveals that although 4 
 
negative the cumulative effects are much smaller compared to all other reasons confirming, at 
least to some extent, the wealth transfer hypothesis also for those. The results are robust over 
regions,  years,  different  calculations  of  the  market  benchmark,  and  also  possible 
contamination because of overlapping event windows.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section one describes our data set and 
the employed methodology. Thereafter, the general impact of rating events is provided which 
are in the following conditioned on the respective rating reason. Section three concludes. 
 
I.  Methodology and Data Set 
A.  The data set 
The  daily  observations  on  CDS  are  collected  from  Bloomberg  and  cross-checked  via 
Datastream  for all firms available, where the 5-year term for senior subordinated debt  is 
selected due to the largest liquidity in the market. All cases with a standard deviation of zero 
for more than five consecutive trading days are removed from the sample together with firms 
with less than one complete year of observations. Furthermore, we require stock prices to be 
available for each CDS observation, which derive from the same data source. And finally, a 
rating for the respective firm’s  senior unsecured debt  has  to  be assigned where Moody’s 
Ratings Interactive serves as data source. The data run from January 2001 to December 2007. 
This results in a final sample of 472 firms with overall 545,184 daily observations and 1,501 
rating events. Table 1 shows that the sample is well distributed over geographical regions 
with North American firms constituting the most represented closely followed by European 
companies what is also reflected in the number of events. Note that a selection bias (and data 
mining) was avoided by collecting data on all constituents of major local as well as global 5 
 
indices accompanied by a Bloomberg list
2 from Markit™ Group on entities for which CDS 
pricing is available. Investment grade rated firms account for more than 86 percent of the 
observations but the rather large sample size contributes to a significant number also of non-
investment grade rated obligors. CDS spreads have largely been decreasing over the period 
2002 until 2006 while the slight increase in 2007 is partly attributable to the beginning of the 
financial crisis. The spread augmentation by weakening credit quality of obligors is in line 
with general expectations. 
Table 1:  Number of Firms, Observations and Events by Geographical Region, and 
CDS Spread Level in basis points and Number of Observations over Years 
and Broad Rating Classes 
In the upper table the number of firms, observations, and rating events including both rating reviews and changes 
are displayed. At the bottom, the CDS spread level in basis points and the number of observations in the brackets 
beneath are provided for broad rating classes on a yearly basis and for the whole data set. 
 
Firms  Observations  Events 
North America  185  214,034  669 
Europe  153  197,211  471 
Asia-Pacific  133  132,320  358 
Latin America  1  1,619  3 
Total  472  545,184  1,501 
 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2001 - 2007 
AAA - Aa  31  42  24  16  14  11  17  19 
 
(1,528)  (7,143)  (10,246)  (11,545)  (13,133)  (13,497)  (15,240)  (72,332) 
A  87  83  47  30  25  21  28  34 
 
(1,883)  (15,983)  (24,399)  (29,303)  (36,850)  (37,487)  (35,200)  (181,105) 
Baa  191  178  92  55  51  42  47  65 
 
(858)  (15,037)  (32,645)  (41,131)  (44,138)  (42,424)  (39,802)  (216,035) 
Ba  145  612  368  163  157  145  144  190 
 
(85)  (1,996)  (5,206)  (9,932)  (14,216)  (12,148)  (9,654)  (53,237) 
B - C  178  412  506  335  374  355  339  369 
 
(83)  (706)  (2,519)  (3,738)  (4,225)  (5,424)  (5,780)  (22,475) 
Total  91  142  101  65  63  57  61  73 
   (4,437)  (40,865)  (75,015)  (95,649)  (112,562)  (110,980)  (105,676)  (545,184) 
 
                                                 
2 This list is a reference entity database project called “RED” and was developed in 2002 by Deutsche Bank AG, 
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co. and sold in August 2003 to Markit Group. It links debt 
issuers to their obligations using Cusip-linked pair codes. 6 
 
Table  2  depicts  the  number  of  rating  reviews  and  rating  changes  split  into  positive  and 
negative events as well as their total number. Their number in each rating category is highly 
related to the respective sample size but nearly identically distributed over rating reviews and 
rating changes. Note that reviews for upgrade and actual upgrades account for 637 or more 
than  42%  of  all  events  in  contrast  to  prior  research  where  it  is  often  indicated  that  the 
insignificant results for upgrades could result from the rather small sample size with regard to 
this group.  
Table 2:  Number of Rating Reviews and Rating Changes by Broad Rating Classes 
The table displays the number of rating reviews and rating changes split into negative (down), positive (up) and 
total events for broad rating classes as well as for investment grade and non-investment grade rated obligors and 
the whole data set. 
 
Rating Reviews    Rating Changes 
 
Down  Up  Total    Down  Up  Total 
AAA  2  0  2    3  0  3 
Aa  35  14  49    36  35  71 
A  136  67  203    128  88  216 
Baa  182  127  309    167  154  321 
Ba  54  50  104    62  71  133 
B-C  28  10  38    31  21  52 
Investment Grade  355  208  563    334  277  611 
Non-Investment Grade  82  60  142    93  92  185 
Total  437  268  705    427  369  796 
 
The respective reason for a rating review or rating change is derived from Moody’s rating 
reports available at Moody’s Ratings Interactive.
3 In line with Goh and Ederington (1993), 
our “Capital Structure” category accounts for changes in a firm’s leverage. On the other hand, 
we split the reasons into five more groups with “Operating Performance” and to some extent 
“Financial Metrics” comparable to Group 1 and “Event Risk”, “New Methodology” and “No 
Reason” related to Group 3 in Goh et al. (1993). “Operating Performance” represents all 
factors  which  have  an  influence  on  a  firm’s  ability  to  generate  future  cash  flows  while 
                                                 
3 The reason for a rating review or rating change is generally provided in the second sentence of the rating report 
following the information about the possible or actual new rating level. 7 
 
“Capital Structure” subsumes influences on firms’ leverage as for example leveraged buyouts 
or  share  repurchases.  “Financial  Metrics”  constitutes  a  hybrid  of  these  two  groups  and 
captures keywords in the rating reports which indistinguishably impact operating performance 
and capital structure simultaneously. Examples are the relation of cash flows to debt levels or 
of credit facilities to operating gains or losses. “Event Risk” comprises essentially exogenous 
events  affecting  the  firm  as  for  example  industry-specific  regulation  changes,  pending 
litigation  or  wars.  Finally,  the  group  “New  Methodology”  accounts  for  rating  reviews  or 
changes if Moody’s changed its rating methodology
4 and “No Reason” is assigned if a reason 
was not indicated in the rating report. 
The reason for a rating review or rating change is identified via specific keywords mentioned 
in the rating report. For each report, up to three keywords are prioritized by their order of 
importance where we assume the most significant to be mentioned first and the two others 
correspondingly. Keywords not occurring in our list of the 45 most frequent shown in Table 3 
are matched to the one closest in signification. In the case of two or more keywords matching 
a specific category this reason is ascribed to the event. If all keywords indicate a different 
reason the priority 1 keyword is chosen. On the other hand, if the reason inducing the rating 
action is explicitly mentioned by Moody’s we refrain from this procedure and directly employ 
it. Table 3 displays for each reason category the aforementioned 45 keywords by their priority 
and total occurrence. Note that more than half of all priority 1 ranked keywords derive from 
“Operating  Performance”  which  evidently  constitutes  a  very  important  factor  for  firms’ 
expected credit risk. 
 
                                                 
4 Moody’s introduced its Loss-Given-Default model for non-investment grade rated loans, bonds and preferred 
stocks in the U.S. in 2006 and in the EMEA (Europe, Middle East and Africa) region in 2007 which also altered 
the loss severity assumptions on senior subordinated debt. Furthermore, the Government-Related Issuer (GRI) 
methodology  for  EMEA  and  Asian-Pacific  corporate  issuers  was  implemented  in  2005.  Besides  the  firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk it accounts for its  government’s rating, the conjoint default correlation and the degree of 
government support. 8 
 
Table 3:  Keywords in Moody’s reports for the selection of Reason Category 
The table displays the keywords in Moody’s rating reports after rating reviews or rating changes subdivided into 
the five reason categories Operating Performance, Capital Structure, Financial Metrics, Event Risk and New 
Methodology  and  ordered  by  their  total  occurrence.  The  priority  is  chosen  by  the  order  of  mention,  i.e.  a 
keyword receives a priority rank of one if it is mentioned first, priority two if mentioned second and priority 
three if mentioned third.  
 
Priority Rank   
   
Priority Rank   
 
1  2  3  Total 
   
1  2  3  Total 
OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Operating Performance  174  63  21  258 
 
Leverage  168  55  44  267 
Profitability  102  96  41  239 
 
Capital Structure  81  39  29  149 
Cash Flow Generation  67  107  61  235 
 
Financial Risk  34  42  6  82 
Business Risk  116  73  40  229 
 
Financial Profile  31  34  5  70 
Earnings  100  61  17  178 
 
Debt Reduction  24  22  14  60 
Operating Environment  60  35  31  126 
 
Financial Position  24  18  13  55 
Market Position  29  14  19  62 
 
Balance Sheet Structure  11  10  12  33 
Liquidity  13  13  19  45 
 
Credit Profile  10  16  4  30 
Competition  12  15  12  39 
 
Financial Risk Profile  5  13  4  22 
Sales  12  19  6  37 
 
Financial Policy  5  6  6  17 
Growth Potential  16  16  3  35 
 
Financial Structure  0  6  1  7 
Integration  6  16  13  35 
 
Restoration of Equity  0  2  0  2 
Restructuring  9  15  8  32 
   
       
Diversification  10  8  12  30 
 
FINANCIAL METRICS 
Profit Margin  11  10  9  30 
 
Financial Metrics  144  124  66  334 
Revenues  17  11  2  30 
 
Financial Flexibility  27  45  11  83 
Demand  13  10  1  24 
 
Capitalization  1  5  3  9 
Business Portfolio  8  10  3  21 
   
       
Products  7  8  3  18 
 
EVENT RISK 
Competitiveness  6  4  0  10 
 
Event Risk  37  9  5  51 
Production Profile  5  3  0  8 
 
Corporate Governance  25  3  3  31 
Business Risk Profile  2  1  1  4 
 
Regulatory Environment  11  5  6  22 
Capital Efficiency  0  1  2  3 
   
       
Efficiency  2  0  1  3 
 
NEW METHODOLOGY 
Retained Earnings  2  1  0  3 
 
New Methodology  59  1  0  60 
Operational Volatility  0  1  0  1 
   
       
 
Table  4  shows  the  number  of  positive  and  negative  events  for  each  reason  category. 
“Operating Performance” constitutes the largest group followed by “Capital Structure” and 
“Financial Metrics”. This could on the one hand relate to the number of keywords utilized for 
those but on the other hand, considering the important factors for firms’ credit rating, is also 
in line with general expectations and should relate to the larger influence of certain criteria on 
future credit quality. 9 
 
Table 4:  Number of Rating Reviews and Rating Changes by Reason Category 
The table displays the number of rating reviews and rating changes split into negative (down), positive (up) and 
total events for the five reason categories Operating Performance, Capital Structure, Financial Metrics, Event 
Risk and New Methodology together with the number of reports not indicating a reason for the rating action. 
 
Rating Reviews    Rating Changes 
 
Down  Up  Total    Down  Up  Total 
Operating Performance  204  194  398    236  230  466 
Capital Structure  138  37  175    116  65  181 
Financial Metrics   53  27  80    48  19  67 
Event Risk  37  6  43    20  7  27 
New Methodology  2  2  4    7  48  55 
No Reason   3  2  5    0  0  0 
Total  437  268  705    427  369  796 
 
B.  Methodology 
We  apply  an  event  study  methodology  to  analyze  the  abnormal  returns  in  stock  and  the 
abnormal spread changes in CDS markets. For this purpose, we first derive a benchmark and 
subsequently  calculate  the  individual  securities’  deviation.  Following  Brown  and  Warner 
(1980, 1985), two models are employed to calculate the abnormal log return 𝐴?𝑖 for the stock 
of each firm 𝑖, i.e. 
                 𝐴?𝑖𝑡  = ?𝑖𝑡  − ?𝑖 − ?𝑖??𝑡            (1) 
                    𝐴?𝑖𝑡  = ?𝑖𝑡  − ??𝑡              (2) 
with ??𝑡 denoting the log return of the market benchmark ? at time 𝑡 and the two parameters 
? and ? derived from a regression of the respective firm’s log stock return on the respective 
market benchmark’s log return in either the time interval [-360, -121] prior to an event or, if 
not  available,  following  MacKinlay  (1997),  in  the  post-event  period  [61,  300].  Since  we 
require at least 200 observations for their derivation in either time interval 22 events have to 
be dropped from our data sample. We employ the S&P 500, DJ Euro Stoxx 50, Topix 100 and 
MSCI  Asia-Pacific  ex  Japan  as  a  proxy  for  the  market  benchmark  with  regard  to  North 10 
 
American, European, Japanese, and other Asian entities, respectively. Note that equation (1) 
is in general denominated as the market model while (2) depicts a stock index adjustment.  
In line with Norden and Weber (2004), the abnormal spread change 𝐴??𝑖 for the respective 
firm’s CDS is derived via 
    𝐴??𝑖𝑡 =  
(???𝑖𝑡 − ???𝑖𝑡−1) −  𝐼?𝑡 − 𝐼?𝑡−1   𝑖𝑓 𝑡 < 0  
(???𝑖𝑡 − ???𝑖𝑡−1) −  𝐼?𝑡 − 𝐼?𝑡−1   𝑖𝑓 𝑡  ≥ 0 
       (3) 
with 𝐼?𝑡 as the (old) benchmark index of the firm’s rating class prior to the event at 𝑡 = 0 and 
𝐼?𝑡 denoting the (new) benchmark index after a rating change has occurred. Note that (3) 
controls for systematic spread change differences among broad rating classes as well as for 
maturity. This originates from our CDS benchmark derivation where all firms of our dataset 
within this rating class are incorporated if they are not in the investigation period [-90, 30] 
themselves due to an event. Therefore, due to the lack of sufficient observations the only 
Latin-American firm has to be excluded. 
The abnormal returns of stocks and the abnormal spread changes of CDS are analyzed over a 
time period of 120 trading days surrounding the respective event, i.e. either a review for rating 
change or a rating change announcement. This time interval, reflecting nearly six calendar 
months, is split into the three periods [-90, -61], [-60, -31] and [-30, -2] prior to the event to 
investigate possible anticipation effects, the interval [-1, 1] to measure the market reaction to 
the announcement, and the period [2, 30] to analyze a possible post-announcement effect. 
Note that for the derivation of ? and ? in (1), a period of at least 30 trading days serves as a 
cushion to ensure that no possible event effects close to our investigation period bias their 
outcome. To test for the statistical significance of abnormal returns and spread changes, we 
employ a cross sectional t-test as well as a Wilcoxon signed rank test. While the former 
accounts for cross-sectional dependence it nevertheless requires a distribution assumption. In 
contrast, the Wilcoxon signed rank test is non-parametric and furthermore incorporates the 11 
 
magnitude  of  abnormal  effects.  We  also  report  the  percentage  of  positive  and  negative 
abnormal returns and spread changes. 
 
II.  The Impact of Credit Rating Announcements 
A.  The General Impact of Credit Rating Announcements in Stock and CDS Markets 
The current literature on the impact of rating changes in capital markets is manifold
5 and can 
be subdivided into the impact of rating outlooks, rating reviews, and rating changes on stocks, 
bonds and CDS. All three markets in general anticipate and respond to negative events while 
the findings on positive rating actions are heterogeneous. The studies of Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1986), Hull et al. (2004), and Norden and Weber (2004) detect no significant 
reaction for the latter opposed to Steiner and Heinke (2001), Micu et al. (2006), and Di Cesare 
(2006) who are able to empirically verify an effect in bond and CDS markets and Pinches and 
Singleton (1978), Hand et al.   (1992), Goh and Ederington (1999), Dichev and Piotroski 
(2001), Jorion and Zhang (2007b), and Purda (2007) detecting a significant market reaction 
for stocks. 
Table 5 displays the results for our data sample  which are in line with prior literature. Both 
stock and CDS markets anticipate reviews for downgrade as well as down grades with the 
level of abnormal returns and spread changes gradually increasing over event windows,  and 
show the largest reaction in the announcement interval but no post-announcement effect. Note 
that the level of market reaction is larger for downgrade s in the period [-90, -31] opposed to 
the interval [-30, 1] where the effect for reviews for downgrade economically dominates. This 
argues for an early anticipation of actual downgrades by a larger part of the market explicable 
                                                 
5 A nice overview on the literature of capital market reactions to credit rating events is provided in e.g. Brooks et 
al. (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004). 12 
 
Table 5:  Mean Abnormal Returns (MAR) and Mean Abnormal Spread Changes (MASC) for Rating Reviews and Rating Changes 
The table displays the mean abnormal returns (MAR) for stocks and the mean abnormal spread changes (MASC) in basis points (bps) for CDS divided into positive and negative rating reviews 
and rating changes over a time period of 120 days separated into five time intervals with the event windows [-90, -61], [-60, -31], and [-30, -2] measuring effects prior to the event, the 
announcement interval [-1, 1], and the interval [2, 30] to investigate a possible post-announcement effect. The null hypothesis for the cross-sectional t-test is MAR≥0 and MASC≤0 for negative 
and MAR≤0 and MASC≥0 for positive events. The null hypothesis for the Wilcoxon signed rank test is median-AR≥0 and median-ASC≤0 for negative and median-AR≤0 and median-ASC≥0 for 
positive events. The statistical significance of results is indicated by * = 10%-level, ** = 5%-level and *** = 1%-level for both tests. The number of firms over the respective time intervals is 
represented as n. 
Stocks 
 
[-90, -61]  [-60, -31]  [-30, -2]  [-1, 1]  [2, 30] 
     
[-90, -61]  [-60, -31]  [-30, -2]  [-1, 1]  [2, 30] 
Review for 
Downgrade 
MAR (%)  -0.0482     -0.0779     -0.1440     -0.7049     0.0179    
 
Review for 
Upgrade 
MAR (%)  0.0164     0.0254     0.0262     0.2931     -0.0047    
t-test  -2.273  **  -3.050  ***  -3.638  ***  -3.576  ***  0.875   
 
t-test  0.899    1.215    1.351  *  3.537  ***  -0.295   
% of MARs<0  56.72    52.64    56.15    55.43    51.73   
 
% of MARs>0  53.39    52.71    53.79    56.44    50.00   
Sign rank  -2.676  ***  -2.142  **  -3.419  ***  -2.884  ***  0.016   
 
Sign rank  0.595    0.901    2.031  **  2.965  ***  -0.147   
n  409    416    431    433    433   
 
n  251    258    264    264    264   
 
   
 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
           
Downgrade 
MAR (%)  -0.0877    -0.1059    -0.1344    -0.5741    0.0062   
 
Upgrade 
MAR (%)  0.0190    -0.0241    0.0014    0.0393    -0.0095   
t-test  -3.460  ***  -4.005  ***  -3.301  ***  -3.272  ***  0.216   
 
t-test  1.162    -1.790  **  0.090    0.867    -0.681   
% of MARs<0  56.01    55.09    57.52    54.42    50.00   
 
% of MARs>0  52.16    48.02    52.92    51.39    48.47   
Sign rank  -3.832  ***  -3.160  ***  -3.454  ***  -2.856  ***  0.163   
 
Sign rank  1.030    -2.070  **  0.505    0.965    -0.661   
n  391    403    419    419    418   
 
n  347    354    359    360    359   
     
 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
            Credit Default Swaps 
 
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
           
Review for 
Downgrade 
MASC (bps)  0.2560    0.3209    1.0265    9.0923    -0.1106   
 
Review for 
Upgrade 
MASC (bps)  -0.0698    0.0369    0.1083    -0.8388    -0.0396   
t-test  1.894  **  2.807  ***  2.931  ***  3.922  ***  -0.514   
 
t-test  -1.329  *  0.611    1.819  **  -2.675  ***  -0.731   
% of MASCs>0  49.51    53.22    54.48    69.57    45.08   
 
% of MASCs<0  49.41    46.18    40.67    58.96    43.28   
Sign rank  0.855    2.234  **  3.911  ***  9.058  ***  -2.242  ** 
 
Sign rank  -0.039    1.716  **  2.617  ***  -3.304  ***  1.533  * 
n  412    419    435    437    437   
 
n  255    262    268    268    268   
 
   
 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
           
Downgrade 
MASC (bps)  0.3329    0.5635    0.8792    6.7430    0.0089   
 
Upgrade 
MASC (bps)  0.0121    0.0733    -0.0114    -0.3563    0.0276   
t-test  1.984  **  3.117  ***  2.086  **  2.885  ***  0.035   
 
t-test  0.242    1.741  **  -0.272    -2.364  ***  0.716   
% of MASCs>0  53.55    52.45    48.71    60.71    42.79   
 
% of MASCs<0  47.61    45.30    42.66    59.62    42.66   
Sign rank  2.031  **  2.723  ***  0.957    5.539  ***  -2.019  ** 
 
Sign rank  0.929    2.208  **  2.156  **  -4.275  ***  2.386  *** 
n  394     408     425     425     423    
 
n  355     362     368     369     368    13 
 
by Moody’s prior indication of a rating change for some firms either via a rating outlook or a 
rating review which could possibly slightly distort the results. Excluding the cases where the 
investigation period for rating reviews and changes overlaps nevertheless does not change this 
finding. This might derive from the difference of certainty for the two rating actions. While 
Moody’s tries to resolve a rating review within the following 90 days with the possibility of 
not changing the rating, a rating change is intended to reflect firms’ credit quality for the long 
term with the agency’s reputation at risk. Therefore, new information with a high level of 
certainty will result in a rating change while more uncertain factors will be further evaluated 
in a rating review. However, investors also have to assess this new information and depending 
on the level of certainty will adjust their positions at different points in time with fewer early 
corrections when the information is uncertain. The strong announcement effect, on the other 
hand, argues for ratings agencies ability to reveal important information to a still large part of 
the market. Furthermore, comparing the level of this effect between rating reviews and rating 
changes shows that reviews reflect a larger surprise in both the stock and the CDS market. 
Considering  positive  rating  events,  the  results  are  either  statistically  or  economically 
insignificant except for reviews for upgrade in the stock market. 
This finding is also confirmed in Figure 1 where the average abnormal cumulative returns and 
spread changes are displayed over our event period. It reveals that positive rating actions have 
no economically meaningful effect in CDS markets. Stocks on the other hand show positive 
cumulative abnormal returns of about 3% for reviews for upgrade while upgrades also seem 
to be irrelevant. In light of these rather immaterial findings we withdraw in the following 
from  a  deeper  analysis  of  positive  rating  events  and  concentrate  on  negative  actions. 
Considering  those,  both  stock  and  CDS  markets  reveal  results  in  line  with  general 
expectations. Over the event period [-90, 30], a downgrade (review for downgrade) results in 14 
 
cumulative abnormal returns of -9.9% (-8.2%) for stocks
6 and a cumulative abnormal increase 
of CDS spreads of 63.4 bps (62.8 bps). The strong announcement effect in all these cases 
argues  again for credit  rating agencies’ ability  to  add information to  the market  by their 
modified assessment of obligors’ credit risk. 
Figure 1:  Mean Cumulative Abnormal Performance in the Stock and the CDS Market 
for Positive and Negative Rating Events 
The figure shows the cumulative mean abnormal returns in % and cumulative mean abnormal spread changes in 
basis points for positive (on the right hand side) and negative (on the left hand side) rating events in the stock (in 
the upper row) and CDS (in the lower row) market over the event period [-90, 30]. 
 
 
 
Kliger and Sarig (2000), and Jorion and Zhang (2007b) have shown that the effects of rating 
changes in capital markets increase by declining credit quality of firms. We therefore divide 
our  sample  into  broad  rating  classes  and  analyze  the  general  market  reactions  to  ensure 
dddddd 
                                                 
6 Regarding stocks, we just present the results for the  market model due to the almost equivalent outcome 
employing the stock index adjustment. 
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Table 6:  Announcement Effects by Broad Rating Classes 
The table displays the MARs for stocks and the MASC for CDS due to rating reviews for downgrade and rating 
downgrades for the whole data sample as well as subdivided into broad rating categories. The results are shown 
for  a  time  period  of  3  days  surrounding  the  rating  action,  i.e.  the  announcement  interval  [-1,  1].  For  the 
remaining statistical results the explanations for Table 5 apply. 
   
Stocks      CDS 
 
 
Review for 
Downgrade  Downgrade     
Review for 
Downgrade  Downgrade 
Total 
MAR (%)  -0.7049     -0.5741    
 
MASC (bps)  9.0923     6.7430    
t-test  -3.576  ***  -3.272  *** 
 
t-test  3.922  ***  2.885  *** 
% of MARs<0  55.43    54.42   
 
% of MASCs>0  69.57    60.71   
Sign rank  -2.884  ***  -2.856  *** 
 
Sign rank  9.058  ***  5.539  *** 
n  433    419   
 
n  437    425   
     
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
AAA-Aa 
MAR (%)  -0.1690    -0.2546   
 
MASC (bps)  0.4284    0.4627   
t-test  -0.797    -0.940   
 
t-test  1.061    1.909  ** 
% of MARs<0  52.63    55.26   
 
% of MASCs>0  56.41    56.41   
Sign rank  -0.442    -0.703   
 
Sign rank  0.893    1.535  * 
n  38    38   
 
n  39    39   
     
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
A 
MAR (%)  -0.4505    -0.1850   
 
MASC (bps)  3.0167    1.8727   
t-test  -2.295  **  -1.387  * 
 
t-test  3.905  ***  2.475  *** 
% of MARs<0  59.46    54.33   
 
% of MASCs>0  71.14    61.72   
Sign rank  -2.234  **  -0.753   
 
Sign rank  5.226  ***  2.968  *** 
n  148    127   
 
n  149    128   
     
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
Baa 
MAR (%)  -0.8038    -0.8597   
 
MASC (bps)  9.9029    7.5181   
t-test  -2.107  **  -2.636  *** 
 
t-test  3.335  ***  2.672  *** 
% of MARs<0  51.70    52.15   
 
% of MASCs>0  69.10    59.88   
Sign rank  -1.130    -1.945  ** 
 
Sign rank  5.831  ***  3.452  *** 
n  176    163   
 
n  178    167   
     
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
Ba 
MAR (%)  -1.2324    -0.2774   
 
MASC (bps)  13.5911    2.8104   
t-test  -1.613  *  -0.706   
 
t-test  3.856  ***  1.211   
% of MARs<0  66.00    62.90   
 
% of MASCs>0  80.00    59.68   
Sign rank  -2.119  **  -1.798  ** 
 
Sign rank  4.233  ***  2.247  ** 
n  50    62   
 
n  50    62   
     
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
B-C 
MAR (%)  -2.2057    -2.4590   
 
MASC (bps)  50.7080    40.6294   
t-test  -1.490  *  -1.706  ** 
 
t-test  1.283    1.388  * 
% of MARs<0  57.14    72.41   
 
% of MASCs>0  61.90    68.97   
Sign rank  -1.199    -1.892  ** 
 
Sign rank  1.442  *  2.108  ** 
n  21     29    
 
n  21     29    
 
the  quality  and  representativeness  of  our  data  thereby  also  amending  their  work  via  the 
inclusion of rating reviews. For reasons of conciseness, only the respective announcement 
effects are reported. Table 6 confirms the finding of stronger effects for obligors with lower 
credit quality. Especially rating reviews reveal gradually enlarging effects in both the stock 
and the CDS market. Except for firms rated Ba, this is also true for statistically significant 
results when rating agencies announce downgrades. Note that in general this finding is also 16 
 
confirmed for positive rating actions which are not depicted for reasons of their rather small 
economic significance. The superior pattern of rating reviews and their comparable or even 
larger level argues for their importance in the assessment of firms’ future credit risk and rating 
agencies’ ability to reveal new information with these confirming again that in many cases 
they are a surprise to the market. 
B.  The Impact of Reasons for Credit Rating Announcements 
Our results are so far completely in line with the literature on general capital market reactions 
to credit rating announcements but have not yet been conditioned on the respective reason for 
these. As already mentioned, we conjecture a measurement error in them, and accordingly this 
strand of literature, because some irrelevant reasons for rating changes might be included 
which  could  result  in  misleading  interpretations.  Even  though  the  findings  of  Goh  and 
Ederington (1993) provide a first indication for this assumption they only consider rating 
changes for the stock market. On the other hand, we are able to particularly investigate their 
statement that surprise downgrades were bad news to bondholders but not imperatively to 
stockholders by also incorporating rating reviews which should provide a much better proxy 
for market surprises compared to actual rating changes often succeeding those. Furthermore, 
the incorporation of CDS also provides an indication for the abnormal change in credit risk 
perceived by the credit market. 
The size of the data sample allows us to initially identify six reason categories. This should 
result in less distorted results and provide a clear picture of capital market reactions to rating 
actions conditioned on their respective reason. Nevertheless, all events corresponding to either 
the category “New Methodology” or “No Reason” have to be excluded in the following due to 
their  marginal  occurrence.  This  leaves  us  with  the  categories  “Operating  Performance”, 
“Capital Structure”, “Financial Metrics”, and “Event Risk”. In line with the results of Goh and 17 
 
Ederington (1993), at least for downgrades in the stock market, we should expect a sizeable 
and  significant  announcement  effect  for  “Operating  Performance”  and  an  abnormal 
performance prior to “Event Risk” announcements. Rating Actions due to changes in firms’ 
“Capital  Structure”,  on  the  other  hand,  should  not  lead  to  any  abnormal  capital  market 
reaction. The hybrid nature of “Financial Metrics” suggests a small, if any, announcement 
effect. 
Table 7 shows the abnormal effects of negative rating reviews and changes in stock and CDS 
markets. It provides empirical evidence that the significant overall abnormal performance in 
these  markets  is  mainly  attributable  to  credit  agencies’  evaluation  of  changes  in  the 
“Operating Performance” of firms.  This  category  comprises an anticipation as  well as an 
announcement effect in both stock and credit markets strongly arguing for its importance to 
investors.  Furthermore  for  reviews  for  downgrade,  a  slight  anticipation  of  “Event  Risk” 
announcements in the stock and an announcement effect in the “Capital Structure” and “Event 
Risk” categories in both markets can be observed. Downgrades only generate other abnormal 
returns and spread changes than “Operating Performance”-related for rating changes due to 
“Event Risk” over the interval [-30, 1]. The insignificant results for all remaining reason 
categories and time intervals for both reviews for downgrade and downgrades confirm our 
initial conjecture that the findings in prior research which did not condition on the rating 
reason contain a measurement error and accordingly have to be interpreted with caution.  
Regarding the anticipation of rating actions, besides “Event Risk” in the interval [-30, -2] no 
other  category  than  “Operating  Performance”  shows  statistically  significant  results.  As 
mentioned in Goh et al. (1993), rating actions relating to “Event Risk” are often in response to 
known  events  and  the  abnormal  anticipation  effects  are  therefore  not  surprising.  The 
anticipation of changes in firms’ operating performance on the other hand is in contrast to 
their findings. We think that this is attributable to stricter disclosure requirements for firms 18 
 
over  the  last  years  and  additionally  easier  access  to  information  for  market  participants 
facilitated by technological advancement. Nevertheless, rating events due to changes in firms’ 
“Financial  Metrics”  do  neither  show  significant  anticipation  nor  announcement  effects 
arguing for their irrelevance to the market. This is also true for downgrades in relation to 
firms’ “Capital Structure” but reviews for downgrade show no anticipation but a significant 
announcement effect what indicates that rating agencies are able to add new information to 
the market for this category. 
Rating events due to firms’ “Capital Structure” require special attention at this point. While 
most  statistically  significant  results  are  in  line  with  general  expectations,  i.e.  negative 
abnormal returns for stocks and positive abnormal spread changes for CDS in response to 
negative rating events, reviews for downgrade in the stock market reveal an irregular picture. 
Reviews due to changes in the “Capital Structure” generate significant positive returns of 
0.55% in the interval [-1, 1] in contrast to the negative outcome for all other reason categories 
and accordingly bias the overall result upwards. This confirms the conjecture of Goh and 
Ederington  (1993)  and  Jorion  and  Zhang  (2007a),  that  a  surprise  downgrade  does  not 
necessarily  have  to  be  bad  news  for  stockholders  when  wealth  is  transferred  from 
bondholders.  An  increase  in  leverage  may  augment  stockholders’  future  returns  but  also 
significantly enlarges the credit risk for bondholders resulting in higher CDS premiums. Table 
7 supports that a negative rating action is always negative news for (long) credit investors but 
the effects for stockholders depend on the reason for the rating event especially when these 
are a surprise to the market.  
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Table 7:  Mean  Abnormal  Returns  (MAR)  and  Mean  Abnormal  Spread  Changes 
(MASC) by Moody’s Reasons for Rating Reviews and Rating Changes 
The table shows the MARs for stocks and the MASC for CDS due to either a rating review for downgrade or a 
rating downgrade for the whole dataset as well as for the respective reason for the rating action. Regarding the 
statistical results the explanations for Table 5 apply. 
 
 
   
Review for 
Downgrade
MAR (%) -0.0482 -0.0779 -0.1440 -0.7049 0.0179 MASC (bps) 0.2560 0.3209 1.0265 9.0923 -0.1106
t-test -2.273 ** -3.050 *** -3.638 *** -3.576 *** 0.875 t-test 1.894 ** 2.807 *** 2.931 *** 3.922 *** -0.514
% of MARs<0 56.72 52.64 56.15 55.43 51.73 % of MASCs>0 49.51 53.22 54.48 69.57 45.08
Sign rank -2.676 *** -2.142 ** -3.419 *** -2.884 *** 0.016 Sign rank 0.855 2.234 ** 3.911 *** 9.058 *** -2.242 **
n 409 416 431 433 433 n 412 419 435 437 437
MAR (%) -0.1182 -0.1638 -0.2033 -1.5911 0.0051 MASC (bps) 0.3657 0.5465 0.8461 10.2887 0.1718
t-test -3.370 *** -3.342 *** -4.899 *** -4.657 *** 0.163 t-test 1.426 * 2.660 *** 3.302 *** 4.044 *** 0.548
% of MARs<0 59.89 56.48 59.61 67.49 51.23 % of MASCs>0 57.45 56.19 59.80 74.02 48.53
Sign rank -3.339 *** -3.015 *** -4.426 *** -5.538 *** -0.075 Sign rank 1.745 ** 2.364 *** 3.876 *** 7.665 *** -0.611
n 187 193 203 203 203 n 188 194 204 204 204
MAR (%) 0.0220 0.0000 -0.0550 0.5541 0.0143 MASC (bps) -0.0301 0.1582 1.1250 4.5686 0.0771
t-test 0.917 0.001 -0.555 2.945 *** 0.493 t-test -0.229 1.372 * 1.173 2.770 *** 0.308
% of MARs<0 50.76 46.21 47.41 42.65 53.68 % of MASCs>0 38.81 47.76 48.18 67.39 40.58
Sign rank 0.288 0.379 1.199 2.500 *** -0.293 Sign rank -1.547 * 0.059 0.167 3.769 *** -1.946 **
n 132 132 135 136 136 n 134 134 137 138 138
MAR (%) 0.0719 0.0187 -0.1258 -0.2886 0.0193 MASC (bps) 0.1840 -0.2514 1.3315 16.6486 -1.2178
t-test 1.318 * 0.461 -1.157 -0.479 0.405 t-test 0.811 -1.041 1.476 * 1.058 -1.741 **
% of MARs<0 54.90 51.92 58.49 45.28 54.72 % of MASCs>0 49.02 50.00 47.17 64.15 43.40
Sign rank 0.403 0.392 -0.536 0.456 -0.376 Sign rank 0.412 -0.146 1.040 2.226 ** -1.589 *
n 51 52 53 53 53 n 51 52 53 53 53
MAR (%) -0.1131 -0.0495 -0.1784 -1.1485 0.0991 MASC (bps) 0.9008 0.3737 1.1831 10.1170 -0.5692
t-test -1.119 -0.652 -2.358 *** -2.006 ** 0.914 t-test 1.748 ** 0.828 1.316 * 2.936 *** -0.459
% of MARs<0 60.00 57.14 66.67 54.05 43.24 % of MASCs>0 51.43 57.14 55.56 70.27 45.95
Sign rank -1.785 ** -0.884 -2.184 ** -1.380 * 0.686 Sign rank 0.819 1.409 * 1.383 * 3.296 *** -0.867
n 35 35 36 37 37 n 35 35 36 37 37
Downgrade
MAR (%) -0.0877 -0.1059 -0.1344 -0.5741 0.0062 MASC (bps) 0.3329 0.5635 0.8792 6.7430 0.0089
t-test -3.460 *** -4.005 *** -3.301 *** -3.272 *** 0.216 t-test 1.984 ** 3.117 *** 2.086 ** 2.885 *** 0.035
% of MARs<0 56.01 55.09 57.52 54.42 50.00 % of MASCs>0 53.55 52.45 48.71 60.71 42.79
Sign rank -3.832 *** -3.160 *** -3.454 *** -2.856 *** 0.163 Sign rank 2.031 ** 2.723 *** 0.957 5.539 *** -2.019 **
n 391 403 419 419 418 n 394 408 425 425 423
MAR (%) -0.1158 -0.1509 -0.1295 -0.7387 0.0037 MASC (bps) 0.4955 0.6525 0.6663 7.1912 0.0879
t-test -2.811 *** -3.882 *** -3.128 *** -3.094 *** 0.099 t-test 1.835 ** 2.543 *** 1.896 ** 3.328 *** 0.260
% of MARs<0 55.66 58.82 60.09 59.23 48.07 % of MASCs>0 55.14 56.95 53.39 63.56 44.92
Sign rank -3.259 *** -3.362 *** -3.046 *** -4.137 *** 0.465 Sign rank 2.099 ** 3.095 *** 1.924 ** 5.622 *** -1.212
n 212 221 233 233 233 n 214 223 236 236 236
MAR (%) -0.0440 -0.0733 -0.1468 -0.0188 0.0289 MASC (bps) 0.1133 0.5008 1.6034 0.1206 -0.1049
t-test -1.499 * -1.523 * -1.245 -0.059 0.560 t-test 0.476 1.348 * 1.199 0.071 -0.452
% of MARs<0 57.27 48.21 54.78 41.74 53.51 % of MASCs>0 50.45 45.13 41.38 49.14 42.11
Sign rank -1.633 * -0.528 -0.502 1.733 ** -0.338 Sign rank 0.347 -0.142 -1.229 -0.223 -1.084
n 110 112 115 115 114 n 111 113 116 116 114
MAR (%) -0.0909 -0.0283 -0.0684 -0.7610 -0.1277 MASC (bps) 0.0173 0.3440 -0.0491 19.2036 0.3761
t-test -1.454 * -0.533 -1.017 -1.288 * -1.314 * t-test 0.048 0.954 -0.163 1.123 0.356
% of MARs<0 55.56 54.35 48.94 53.19 55.32 % of MASCs>0 53.33 46.81 41.67 70.83 37.50
Sign rank -1.405 * -0.410 -0.720 -0.328 -0.624 Sign rank 0.209 0.116 -0.585 2.605 *** -1.087
n 45 46 47 47 47 n 45 47 48 48 48
MAR (%) -0.0131 -0.0165 -0.3602 -1.4830 0.2918 MASC (bps) 0.3297 1.0811 2.4975 10.4260 -2.1241
t-test -0.139 -0.162 -3.157 *** -2.112 *** 1.615 * t-test 0.906 2.269 ** 1.497 * 1.643 * -0.919
% of MARs<0 50.00 61.11 72.22 72.22 33.33 % of MASCs>0 55.56 55.56 66.67 72.22 22.22
Sign rank 0.152 -0.762 -2.765 *** -1.938 * 1.415 * Sign rank 0.196 1.285 1.807 ** 1.764 ** -1.807 **
n 18 18 18 18 18 n 18 18 18 18 18
Stocks Credit Default Swaps
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Figure 2 confirms and even aggravates our argumentation that rating effects should not be 
analyzed  and  interpreted  unconditionally.  It  shows  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  and 
spread  changes  for  rating  reviews  and  rating  changes  by  reason  category  and  provides 
empirical evidence that the overall effect is composed of various and sometimes contradictory 
movements over the event period. Especially reviews for downgrade in the stock market show 
significantly  diverging  results  regarding  the  reason  for  the  rating  action.  While  “Capital 
Structure”  and  “Financial  Metrics”  reviews  both  produce  positive  cumulative  abnormal 
returns until 10 days prior to the event day the two other reason categories exhibit a negative 
cumulative market reaction resulting in an overall negative effect at all times. All categories 
comprise an announcement effect which, in contrast to all other groups, is positive for the 
“Capital Structure” category confirming the results in Table 7. Although less pronounced, this 
adverse announcement effect in the stock market can also be observed for downgrades. The 
results for CDS show that the “Capital Structure” reason also incorporates a rather small 
effect  for  those  in  line  with  Table  7.  We  think  that  this  is  attributable  to  uncertainty  of 
investors. Although an increase in leverage at first glance increases the risk for (long) credit 
investors it also comprises the opportunity of superior returns in the future implying that the 
firm will be able to better fulfill its obligations perhaps also facilitated by an increase of 
efficiency in its operations. The rather small effect should derive from these opposite views of 
investors. Another noticeable result from Figure 2 is the tremendous increase of abnormal 
CDS premiums prior to a downgrade due to “Event Risk” and the converse effect after the 
rating downgrade was announced. This pattern, which also emerges in the stock market in the 
opposite  direction,  argues  for  an  overreaction  of  market  participants  and  shows  that 
idiosyncratic  events  often  come  along  with  speculation  especially  when  negative  rating 
changes are expected. Note that the number of firm observations is rather small and therefore 
these results have to be interpreted with caution. 21 
 
Figure 2:  Mean Cumulative Abnormal Performance by Moody’s Reasons for Rating 
Reviews and Rating Changes 
The figure shows the cumulative MARs for stocks and cumulative MASC for CDS due to a rating review for 
downgrade (on the left side) and a rating downgrade (on the right side) for stocks (in the upper row) and CDS (in 
the lower row). Besides the overall cumulative results, it also shows the capital market patterns subdivided into 
the respective reason of the rating agency for the rating action. 
 
 
 
Although the CDS market grew strongly over our observation period it was originated not 
until the mid-1990’s and spreads may behave differently over geographical regions due to 
varying  market  maturities.  Therefore,  we  conduct  the  same  analysis  for  North  American, 
European  and  Asian  obligors  separately.  Our  results  do  not  show  differences  over  these 
confirming their robustness. The disparity in CDS market maturity could also exist over time. 
Therefore, we also split the sample by years. Neither single years nor combinations of those 
show any deviations from our main results. Furthermore, an analysis of positive rating actions 
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by  reason  categories  reveals  that  no  single  group  or  adverse  effects  drive  the  either 
insignificant  or  just  marginal  findings.  The  positive  announcement  effect  for  reviews  for 
upgrade  in  the  stock  market  on  the  other  hand  largely  derives  from  the  “Operating 
Performance” category arguing again for its importance to investors. As mentioned earlier, we 
have also decontaminated the sample by excluding events where the event period overlaps. 
Neither the major results nor the robustness tests show any inconsistency. In addition, we 
introduce  other  calculation  methodologies  for  abnormal  returns  and  spreads  changes.  For 
stocks,  we  employ  the  aforementioned  stock  index  adjustment,  which  is  based  on  prior 
research. In contrast, we derive alternative abnormal CDS spread changes by first calculating 
them at the firm level and subsequently aggregating them to their respective benchmark. The 
standard benchmark first determines the average CDS spread level for each benchmark and 
subsequently derives the benchmark spread change over consecutive event days. It therefore 
relies on the number of benchmark constituents available on each day and accordingly on the 
mean of their absolute spread levels. The alternative benchmark on the other hand replaces 
absolute levels by the average benchmark spread change and therefore depends much less on 
the number of constituents available for each trading day especially important when their 
number becomes small as it is sometimes the case for lower rating classes. Nevertheless, 
neither the stock index adjustment nor the alternative CDS benchmark calculation change the 
major findings. Although the results for CDS slightly increase in statistical significance the 
economic impact remains rather small for positive events and does not noticeably change for 
negative rating actions. 
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III.  Conclusion 
We investigate the effect of rating reviews and rating changes in stock and CDS markets. 
Besides adding to the literature of their general effects in capital markets, we condition each 
rating  action  on  the  reason  mentioned  by  the  rating  agency.  Our  results  for  the  general 
abnormal market reactions are in line with prior literature for both stock and CDS implying 
either insignificant or only marginal abnormal market reactions for positive events but an 
anticipation and an announcement effect for negative events. Accounting for the respective 
rating  reason  reveals  that  those  two  effects  are  largely  attributable  to  changes  in  firms’ 
operating performance, especially with regard to the market’s anticipation of the rating action. 
This argues for a bias in prior literature when general abnormal effects in relation to rating 
events are interpreted. Furthermore, confirming the hypothesis of Goh et al. (1993) and Jorion 
et al. (2007a), we are able to provide empirical evidence for positive stock price reactions due 
to negative rating surprise announcements in case of changes in firms’ capital structure. This 
even aggravates the interpretation problems for the general capital market effects to rating 
actions.  In  addition,  our  finding  of  increasing  abnormal  returns  and  spread  changes  by 
declining credit quality of firms amends the current literature by also incorporating rating 
reviews which even exhibit a superior pattern. 
Besides  important  implications  for  the  interpretation  of  prior  research  the  findings  also 
provide  new  insights  for  investors.  Although  a  first  conjecture  that  negative  bond  rating 
actions are not necessarily bad news for stockholders was provided in Goh and Ederington 
(1993) subsequent literature did not account and test for the effects of the different reasons for 
a rating review or rating change. Our findings show that negative rating surprises are indeed 
good news for stockholders when these occur due to changes in firms’ capital structure. Credit 
investors  on  the  other  hand  experience  a  negative  performance  without  regard  of  the 
respective reason for the rating event. Nevertheless, this negative performance largely varies 24 
 
over  reason  categories.  Comparing  for  example  “Event  Risk”  to  “Capital  Structure”  the 
difference of cumulative spread changes over our event period amounts to 88 bps for rating 
reviews for downgrade and even 114bps for rating downgrades. Furthermore, most reason 
categories only reveal an announcement effect, especially when the rating action is a surprise 
to the market. Only operating performance-related rating events are anticipated by market 
participants arguing for an information advantage of rating agencies for most other reasons. 
Therefore, although the agencies’ work is in discussion due to the financial crisis, at least in 
the short run, they nevertheless depict a valuable assessment for firms’ credit risk and the 
corresponding investments. 
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